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Ashley Smith, who is typically presented in the media as mentally ill, was nineteen years old 
when she died from self-strangulation in an Ontario women’s prison on October 19th, 2007. In 
this paper, I explore how Ashley Smith’s actions and death were portrayed in four mainstream 
Canadian newspapers (Globe and Mail, Telegraph-Journal, Toronto Star and National Post). 
My aims in this paper are to critically analyze depictions of mental illness presented by these 
news articles and connect these portrayals to labeling theories. Two variables—the timing of the 
news coverage and newspaper political affiliation—emerged as being influential in how 
newspapers depicted Ashley Smith as mentally ill, through their use of generic and/or negative 
terminology and vulnerability stereotypes. I also discuss ‘alternative’ stories of Ashley Smith 
and examine their potential to challenge typical conceptualizations of mental illness, gender and 
carceral environments. 
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Ashley Smith, généralement représentée dans les médias comme une personne souffrant de 
maladie mentale, avant dix-neuf ans quand elle est morte d’auto strangulation dans une prison 
pour femmes  de l’Ontario le 19 octobre 2007. Dans cette étude, j’aborderai comme les gestes et 
la mort de Ashley Smith ont été décrits dans quatre grands journaux publics canadiens (Globe 
and Mail, Telegraph-Journal, Toronto Star et le National Post). Dans cet article, mon objectif 
est d’analyser de manière critique la description de la maladie mentale dans les articles, et de 
relier ces descriptions à des théories sur les stéréotypes. Deux variables, à savoir le moment de 
la publication de la nouvelle et l’appartenance politique du journal, se sont révélés des facteurs 
d’influence  sur la description faite par les journaux de la maladie mentale de Ashley Smith, tel 
que l’illustrent l’utilisation de terminologie générique ou négative et de stéréotypes de 
vulnérabilité. J’aborderai aussi des narratifs « alternatifs » de l’histoire de Ashley Smith, et 
étudier comment ils pourraient remettre en question les concepts répandus sur la maladie mental, 
le genre et les milieux carcéraux. 
 




October 19th, 2012 marked the fifth anniversary of Ashley Smith’s death. At the time of her 
passing, Ashley was a prisoner at Grand Valley Institution for Women—a multi-level federal 
penitentiary located in Kitchener, Ontario (Correctional Service of Canada, 2012). She died while 
under 24-hour video surveillance ‘suicide watch’. Seven trained correctional officers observed and 
failed to intervene as she strangled herself with a cloth ligature. She was nineteen years old. 
  Although deaths in custody are not unique, media coverage of Ashley Smith’s treatment 
and untimely death in corrections has helped publicize serious institutional problems in Canadian 
youth and women’s correctional facilities. The media interest surrounding the Ashley Smith case 













paper, I investigate how Ashley Smith has been portrayed in four mainstream Canadian newspapers 
(Globe and Mail, Toronto Star, Telegraph-Journal and National Post). More specifically, I explore 
in what ways the news coverage labels Ashley Smith as mentally ill and/or defines her behaviour 
and death following a rubric of mental illness stereotypes. According to labeling theories, mental 
illness labels are socially constructed and are rooted in stereotypical notions of race and gender. 
Under this theoretical framework, media depictions of mental illness perpetuate negative 
stereotypes of ‘the mentally ill’, which impact public perceptions of mental illness. In this analysis, 
depictions of mental illness changed depending on the timing of the news coverage, the 
newspaper’s political affiliation, and the location of newspapers. The findings of this paper 
contribute to existing research that uses modified labeling theories by exposing the complexity of 
mental health labeling in Canadian news media. 
 
A Critical Appraisal of Labeling Theory Trends 
 
Ashley Smith is typically described as someone who was mentally ill. In this paper, I consider the 
significance of labeling Ashley Smith as mentally ill by using labeling theories as a theoretical 
framework. Sociological theorizing on the significance of mental health labels began in the 1950s, 
and has since been used to critique mental health discourses that rely on traditional medical models. 
Many researchers use these theoretical frameworks, labeling theories to analyze the stigmatic 
impacts of mental illness stereotyping in mass media sources, to reject the argument that mental 
illness labels are applied objectively. 
  T.J. Scheff’s (1966, 1974) work serves as a foundation for the discourse relating to labeling 
theory and the construction of mental health. Scheff explains that labeling theory is a tool that can 
create another narrative about mental illness. His intention is not to supplant existing research, nor 
deny the material realities of individuals living with mental illness. He uses labeling theory to 
provide a theoretical model that is based outside the medical model (Scheff, 1974). The medical 
model of mental health is rooted in the ‘psy’ sciences—psychiatry and psychology. The major 
assumption of this perspective is that mental illness causality is rooted in underlying biological 
‘abnormalities’ (McLeod, 2008). This means that symptoms of mental illness are understood as 
“outward signs of the inner physical disorder” (McLeod, 2008, n.p.), which are “grouped together 
and classified into a ‘syndrome’” (emphasis in original; McLeod, 2008, n.p.). Ultimately, the 
medical model assumes that “the true cause [of mental illness] can eventually be discovered and 
appropriate physical treatment administered” (McLeod, 2008, n.p.).  
  On the other hand, Scheff’s non-medical model postulates that being labeled as mentally 
ill causes one to become ‘mentally ill’; thus, individuals who are labeled mentally ill internalize 
stereotypical depictions of mental illness and recreate their self-concept as one who is mentally ill 
(Merton, 1948; Scheff, 1966). Scheff maintains that “traditional stereotypes of mental disorder are 
solidly entrenched in the population because they are learned in early childhood and are 
continuously reaffirmed in the mass media and everyday conversation” (1966, p. 84-85). 
Internalization of these public stigmas results in mental illness labels and diagnoses becoming a 
self-fulfilling prophecy: mentally ill individuals perform their illness in accordance with that 
particular illness’s role expectations (Scheff, 1966). For example, an individual diagnosed with 
depression will embody and perform stereotypical understandings of what depression looks like 
based on depictions presented in mass media and other social institutions—attributes such as, being 
socially withdrawn, bedridden, apathetic, and having degraded personal hygiene. The medical 













physiological deficiencies; however, labeling theory contends that in being labeled or diagnosed 
with depression—as opposed to ‘sadness’—the individual identifies as being someone who is 
‘depressed’ and performs accordingly. 
  Scheff’s original work on labeling theory and mental health invoked harsh criticisms from 
other sociological theorists. As a result, Link and colleagues (1989) modified Scheff’s theory 
(Pasman, 2011). The fundamental difference between these two theoretical approaches to mental 
illness is that the modified labeling theory removed indications relating to causation, such that it 
was no longer argued that labeling or diagnosis causes mental illness, but that it is related to how 
an individual’s behaviours are understood by themselves and others. This difference means that 
modified labeling theorists are more interested in exploring why specific labels matter, as opposed 
to explaining how labels create mental illness (O’Connor, 2006). According to modified labeling 
theory, “diagnosis has a negative influence on self-concept through stigma and stigma 
expectations” (emphasis added; Pasman, 2011, p. 124).  
  Mental illness labels create a dichotomous ‘us’ (‘normal’ people) versus ‘them’ (‘mentally 
ill’ people) relationship. The ‘mentally ill’ out-group is perceived as homogenous and is socially 
defined as a whole by negative stereotypes (e.g., unpredictability, dangerousness, laziness) that 
lead to discrimination and social exclusion (Pasman, 2011). These visions of the mentally 
healthy/ill dichotomy and the social exclusion of mentally ill individuals are supported by research 
conducted by Pat Caplan (1995). According to Caplan, images of mental illness “suggest that ‘they’ 
are not as competent, human, or safe to be around as the rest of ‘us’” (1995, p. 11). Furthermore, 
someone who is labeled as mentally ill is “someone who is out of control, out of touch with ‘reality’, 
incapable of forming a good relationship, untrustworthy, quite possibly dangerous, and probably 
not worth one’s attention, time or energy” (Caplan, 1995, p. 11). Mental illness is labeled as a social 
‘problem’ that requires professional intervention and treatment.  
  Sociological research has also challenged the notion that mental illnesses are universal 
across cultures, disrupting the medical model’s assumption that mental illness is organic in nature 
(Morgan et al, 2008). Caplan (1995) maintains that mental health professionals rarely agree upon 
mental illness labels, diagnoses, or treatment plans. This means that people should be critical of 
mental illness labels. In particular, Caplan argues that we must ask “for what purpose they are 
making that judgment” (emphasis in original; 1995, p. 44), and if the intention is to ‘help’ someone, 
is there any evidence that “applying an abnormality label will actually further this intention” (1995, 
p. 44)? Blum (2011) maintains that people must be critical of the omnipresence of medical 
nomenclature in everyday life. He refers to this overreach of the medical profession as 
medicalization: “a means (almost as a tool or technology) for expanding the jurisdiction of 
medicine by redefining social issues as problems that require medical intervention and regulation 
or, at least, official consultation and use of medical expertise” (Blum, 2011, p. 170). It is through 
medicalization that medical practices serve as “biomedical weapons in the colonization of everyday 
life” (Blum, 2011, p.170), acting as tools for social control and deviance regulation. This 
omnipresence of medicalization in social institutions is linked to the institutionalization and 
marginalization of non-hegemonic identities.  
   ‘Health’ and ‘illness’ are not natural categorizations. Instead, these labels entail 
“meaningful practices which raise questions of evaluation and appraisal that are [considered] 
fundamental [to the medical model]” (Blum, 2011, p. 118). Doucet, Letourneau and Stoppard 
(2010) maintain that researchers studying mental illness must move beyond medical model 
approaches by utilizing “a framework that facilitates the examination of how social, political, 













experiences” (p. 305). In the next section, I engage with these critical discourses further as I explore 
how gender and race connect with mental illness labeling theories. 
 
Women in the ‘Mental Health’ Turn: Labeling Theories and Gender 
 
Betty Friedan began problematizing the notion of medicalizing gender role incongruence in her 
book, The Feminine Mystique (1963). Coining the term “the problem that has no name” (1963, p. 
57), Friedan explores the widespread dissatisfaction and unhappiness (white, middle class) 
American suburban housewives felt post-World War II. Friedan (1963) openly critiques the 
medical treatment of the pressures and dissatisfaction that coincide with American femininity and 
argues that women should explore finding personal fulfillment outside of traditional gender roles.  
  Launching from this work, Phyllis Chesler (1972) explores the institutionalization of ‘mad’ 
women. She contends that stigmatic labels associated with women’s mental health serve to 
reproduce patriarchal and class hierarchies in Canada and other ‘Western’ countries. Women are 
stereotypically labeled as ‘help-seekers’, and there is a wider social acceptance of behaviour 
displaying ‘emotional distress’ in women. However, there is a fine line between acceptable 
femininity and unacceptable femininity. It is acceptable for women to be (somewhat) needy, 
dependent, weak and helpless, though Chesler maintains that:  
 
…such female behaviour is judged as annoying, inconvenient, stubborn, childish and 
tyrannical. Beyond a certain point, such behaviour is ‘managed’ rather than rewarded: it is 
treated with disbelief and pity, emotional distance, physical brutality, economic and sexual 
deprivation, drugs, shock therapy, and long-term confinement (1972, p. 39). 
 
As such, women who over-perform acceptable feminine behaviours are considered pitiful, 
childlike, and immature due to the misogynist and patriarchal undervaluation of femininity. 
Characteristics that define notions of femininity that can lead to punishment for over-performance 
include submissiveness, nurturance, sensitivity, and emotional expressiveness (Rosenfield, 2012). 
Rejecting femininity or over-selling femininity can each result in punitive responses.   
  Rigid boundaries of acceptable feminine behaviours result in more women transgressing 
into ‘unacceptable’ or ‘ill’ behaviour—behaviour that would be totally acceptable and ‘normal’ if 
performed by a man (Chesler, 1972). Sarah Rosenfield (1982) analyzed the influence of sex roles 
in societal reactions to mental illness by analyzing a random sample of 666 admissions to a New 
York psychiatric emergency room. She found that sex role expectations influence practitioners’ 
decisions for hospitalization. In particular, men tended to be hospitalized for presenting more 
‘feminine’ types of disorders (e.g., depression) and women tended to be hospitalized for presenting 
more ‘masculine’ types of disorders (e.g., drug addiction and alcoholism) (Rosenfield, 1982). 
Rosenfield (1982) concludes that “the same level or form of behaviour in males and females seems 
more visible or striking if it contradicts sex role expectations and this appears to the observer as a 
more problematic form of the behaviour” (p. 23).  
  Biological sex does not naturally predispose males and females to specific mental illnesses; 
rather, deviant or ‘ill’ behaviours are read as such by practitioners through the lens of gender 
performativity and societal expectations. This research consistently shows that women are 
susceptible to being labeled mentally ill when they fail to conform to rigid notions of femininity 
(Rogers & Pilgrim, 2010). Rosenfield’s findings indicate that both men and women can be 













society privileges masculinity, which results in milder policing of men, as they are granted more 
flexibility in acceptable forms of performance.  
   Emerging from both Friedan and Chelser’s critiques, there is a large body of contemporary 
work that explores the relationship between gender and mental illness from a labeling theory 
perspective. Though this work does not explicitly use labeling theory, it relies upon similar 
theoretical assumptions as those found in labeling theory. First, it is critical of medical definitions 
that are historically rooted in biological determinism and challenges the ‘objectivity’ of mental 
illness labels or diagnoses. Second, it supports the notion found in labeling theory that mental 
illness labeling is a tool used by the powerful to maintain social oppression and exclusion of the 
marginal.  
  Expanding upon the original conceptualizations of femininity, contemporary feminist 
researchers acknowledge that concepts of femininity intersect with race. For example, Black 
femininity is constructed as more flexible and interchangeable than white femininity. Black girls 
are socialized to embrace different aspects of femininity, including inner-strength and self-
sufficiency (Rosenfield, 2012). Because of racism, Black women are excluded from rigid notions 
of white femininity, which means that they are less susceptible to ‘traditional’ mental illness 
stigmas (Rosenfield, 2012). However, this does not mean that black women and men do not 
experience psychological stressors triggered by structural oppressions, such as racism. Black 
individuals displaying ‘ill’ behaviours or stressors are less likely to be medically diagnosed as 
‘mentally ill’. Instead, Black bodies are more likely to be criminalized, labeled as ‘violent’ or 
‘criminal’ and experience higher rates of incarceration (Jiwani, 2002; Silliman & Bhattacharjee, 
2002; Davis, 2007).  
  The same could be argued for Aboriginal women: as opposed to being labeled as ‘ill’, 
Aboriginal women are more often associated with notions of risk and dangerousness. Like Black 
women, this means that Aboriginal women who do not conform to colonial expectations of the 
‘good Aboriginal’ (submissive to and accepting of colonial power) are more likely to be 
criminalized than medicalized. This means that, once again, being less susceptible to mental illness 
labels does not mean that Aboriginal women do not encounter oppression. This is especially true 
for incarcerated Aboriginal women, where being labeled ‘high risk’ means one is not eligible for 
reintegration activities such as work release programs or temporary passes (Shaw and Hannah-
Moffat, 2000), options which may be available for medication-compliant mentally ill prisoners. 
‘High risk’ classifications are designated to 44% of federally sentenced Aboriginal women 
(Pollack, 2008). One of the implications of this over-classification of Aboriginal women is that 
maximum security classifications prevents access to cultural-specific programming like the 
Okimaw Ohci Healing Lodge, which only accepts minimum and medium security women (Pollack, 
2008). Therefore, 44% of Aboriginal women serving a federal sentence are automatically excluded 
from culturally specific programs until they can ‘lower’ their risk through the acceptance of 
normalizing (or colonizing) therapeutic programs, which maintain white cultural ideals of 
‘normalcy’—an ideal that is itself a racialized phenomenon. ‘Normalcy’ assumes that there exists 
an ideal type of person. Moral assessments of who can be understood as ‘normal’ are based on 
white, heteronormative, middle-class values, lifestyles and experiences. This means that racialized, 
queer and poor individuals are often cast as ‘abnormal’, even when they are not labeled as ‘mentally 
ill’. Therefore, avoiding the stigma of one label (mentally ill) does not guarantee freedom from all 
oppressive labels. These intersectional sites of oppression (e.g., racism and sexism) mean that 
criminalization labels and mental health labels operate in conjunction with one another. I now turn 













Mental Health Labels in Women’s Carceral Spaces 
 
 The research discussed above shows that women who are perceived to be challenging patriarchal 
authority are vulnerable to mental illness labels. The same holds true for incarcerated women. There 
is a large body of feminist work that focuses upon traditional notions of femininity in carceral 
spaces. In particular, Carol Smart’s book, Women, Crime and Criminology (1977), problematizes 
the medicalization and pathologizing of women prisoners’ behaviour by correctional staff. Building 
upon this work, considered the catalyst for contemporary feminist criminology, feminist scholarly 
work in criminology has grown exponentially (Chesney-Lind, 2006).  
  Studies of prison populations intensified during the 1980s as the relationship between 
‘gender as performance’ and mental illness was applied to prison populations. One study that builds 
directly from such work is Baskin, Sommers, Tessler and Steadman’s (1989) exploration of gender 
variation in the provision of mental health services in a New York State prison. The researchers 
took a random sample of approximately 10% of the total inmate population (36,144), 142 of whom 
were women (4% of the sample) and 3,495 of whom were men (96% of the sample). These 
percentages reflect the gender breakdown of the overall prison population at the time of the study. 
Their findings reveal that women are vastly overrepresented in mental health placements: 20% of 
women prisoners were in mental health placements versus only 8.7% of male prisoners.  
  Similar to Rosenfield’s (1982) study of non-prisoners, Baskin et al. (1989) conclude that 
there is a correlation between gender incongruence and the provision of mental health services in 
prison. Women who display behaviours that were perceived as aggressive or violent were 
significantly more likely than men exhibiting the same behaviours to be labeled as pathological and 
placed in mental health units. As a corollary to this finding, incarcerated men who displayed 
behaviour typically labeled as ‘feminine’ (e.g., depression) were more likely to be placed in mental 
health units than women prisoners displaying the same symptoms (Baskin et al., 1989).  
  In a 1990 study, Chunn and Menzies maintain that even though incarcerated women are 
labeled mentally ill more frequently than incarcerated men, these women are not more likely than 
their male counterparts to be ‘troubled’ or ‘maladjusted’. Rather, correctional agents are more likely 
to pathologize incarcerated women’s behaviours through assumptive theories based upon perceived 
inherent sex differences and notions of femininity. According to Auerhahn and Leonard (2000), 
mental health units in women’s prisons operate under a rubric of chivalry that conceptualizes 
women inmates as ‘sick’ and in need of ‘treatment’. This ‘treatment’ rhetoric in the criminal justice 
system justifies the medicalization of women prisoners’ ‘problem’ behaviours. Auerhahn and 
Leonard maintain that in mental health units, women are primarily prescribed psychotropic 
medications, such as antidepressants and antipsychotic agents. These medications are often used in 
carceral spaces for non-medical purposes, as “chemical restraints” (Auerhahn & Leonard, 2000, p. 
600) intended to transform non-feminine incarcerated women into docile bodies (Foucault, 1977). 
Stereotypical notions of femininity are enforced in carceral spaces; carceral agents value female 
docility because it is less threatening and easier to manage. Transgressors are labeled as 
pathological and drugged into submission. In addition, the stigmas associated with these labels 
serve to silence and discredit women who are resisting systems of patriarchal oppression.  
  Neve and Pate (2005) argue that at this contemporary, neoliberal moment, prisons are being 
restructured to serve as ‘treatment centers’. They view cutbacks in public spending on mental health 
services in the community as having harshly affected young women with mental and cognitive 
disabilities in particular. Due to this clawback to government spending, women are becoming more 













who display ‘problem’ behaviours. Neve and Pate reinforce this point by stating that “women are 
the fastest-growing prison population worldwide” (2005, p. 27). Furthermore, they argue that: 
 
The increasing number of women in prison is clearly linked to the evisceration of health, 
education, and social services. The cycle of inadequate social services, criminalization, and 
incarceration intensifies in times of economic downturn. It is very clear where current 
policies are sending the people who are experiencing the brunt of the downturn in the 
economy. Jails are our most comprehensive homelessness initiative (Neve & Pate, 2005, 
p. 27-28).  
 
With more and more psychiatric and mental health facilities closing due to a lack of resources, 
individuals who are labeled as mentally ill ultimately become caught in the “stickier social control 
net of our criminal justice system” (Neve & Pate, 2005, p. 28). Furthermore, once in prison, women 
tend to attract a number of psychiatric labels and be characterized as among the most difficult, high-
risk prisoners to ‘manage’ (Neve & Pate, 2005). According to Neve and Pate, “equating mental and 
cognitive disabilities with risks only serves to perpetuate a social construction of persons with 
mental disabilities as dangerous” (2005, p. 28). Consequently, many ‘difficult’ women in prison 
experience harsh penalties, including extended sentences, prolonged isolation, forced 




The aim of this research was to determine whether a newspaper’s subjectivity—in particular its 
political affiliation and circulation audience—affects how Ashley Smith’s story is told. To evaluate 
this objective, I purposefully selected newspapers from different political affiliations (liberal, 
conservative, and centrist) and circulation audiences (provincial or national). The four mainstream 
Canadian newspapers selected for analysis are: Globe and Mail (centrist), National Post 
(conservative), Toronto Star (liberal), and Telegraph-Journal (liberal). Two of these papers are 
nationally circulated (Globe and Mail, National Post), one is circulated in Ontario (Toronto Star), 
and one is based in New Brunswick (Telegraph-Journal). 
  In order to collect relevant news articles from these four newspapers, I used the online 
newspaper database ProQuest Newsstand. ProQuest Newsstand is the only accessible online 
database that archived articles from the Telegraph-Journal. I searched each newspaper 
individually, using the search parameters that I defined. Since I am not bilingual, the first parameter 
I set was for the database to only return results from ‘English newspaper’ sources. The second 
parameter set was the timeframe: articles that were written from October 18, 2007 until October 1, 
2011. These dates were selected to ensure that the day of Ashley Smith’s death (October 19, 2007) 
and the official cancellation date of the first inquest (September 30, 2011) were included in the 
search. My final parameter defined which key terms ProQuest Newsstand was to search for in the 
four newspapers. In the keywords search bar, “Ashley Smith” (including quotation marks) was the 
only term searched. This was to ensure a return of all articles that mentioned Ashley Smith, which 
I then filtered for relevance by previewing each article. I deleted any news stories that did not 
directly discuss Ashley Smith. Within these parameters, my search yielded 235 Ashley Smith news 
stories: 37 from the Globe and Mail; 20 from the National Post; 103 from Telegraph-Journal; and 













  For this research, the 235 newspaper articles that discussed the Ashley Smith case were 
critically read. According to Mahmood (n.d.), critical reading as a research method1 is: 
 
An active approach to reading that involves an in depth examination of the text. 
Memorization and understanding of the text is achieved. Additionally, the text is broken 
down into its components and examined critically in order to achieve a meaningful 
understanding of the material (p. 2). 
 
  Zemliansky (2008) explains that critical reading involves questioning the face value of 
information. Researchers engaged in critical reading must “investigate, test, and even doubt every 
claim, every example, every story, and every conclusion” (Zemliansky, 2008, n.p.). However, 
engaging in critical reading does not mean that the reader must ‘criticize’ (or reject outright) the 
text. Instead, critical reading involves careful evaluations and analyses of a text’s ideas and how 
they are constructed and presented (Zemliansky, 2008).  
  According to Mahmood (n.d.) and Zemliansky (2008) critical reading as a research method 
involves three key steps: previewing, writing, and critical reading. Previewing is when the 
researcher performs a brief screening of the text, scanning key words, headlines/titles, and 
references. This previewing stage allows the researcher to accomplish a general understanding of 
the text and form meaningful expectations from the reading (Mahmood, n.d.). The second step 
(writing) and third step (critical reading) occur simultaneously. Mahmood (n.d.) and Zemliansky 
(2008) argue that critical readers must take written notes while actively reading. Both authors 
suggest multiple note-taking strategies, including: underlining/highlighting key points, margin 
writing, divided page method, landmark/footnote method, journaling, and creating response 
questions. However, Mahmood (n.d.) and Zemliansky (2008) maintain that this writing step should 
only be done after the first reading of a text. Thus, critical reading involves multiple readings of 
the same text and written responses to the key arguments contained within these texts.  
  Following these three key steps as outlined by Mahmood (n.d.) and Zemliansky (2008), I 
first began my critical reading by previewing all 235 collected articles. In this previewing stage, I 
scanned over headlines, authors, and dates to verify their relevance to Ashley Smith and to gain an 
understanding as to what issues may be discussed. I then fully read each article through once and I 
highlighted any passages that I found salient. When I read each of these articles for a second time, 
I simultaneously created a reading journal in which I wrote down key arguments and my responses 
to those arguments. Emergent from this reading journal were three main themes: negative/generic 
terminology, vulnerability stereotypes, and alternative narratives. In the next section I outline in 




The main question guiding this research was whether stereotypical depictions of mental illness are 
reflected in the news articles about Ashley Smith from the four mainstream Canadian newspapers. 
The first theme emerging from my analysis is the reliance upon using generic references and 
                                                        
1 Critical reading, as a method, is understood within this project as being situated in the wider 
methodological approach of critical discourse analysis (CDA). As such, I share the perspective that 
language (spoken and textual) and sociopolitical power structures share an intimate connection in either 













negative labels to describe Ashley as mentally ill. The analysis discloses that liberal and centrist 
newspapers used generic labeling in discussing Ashley’s mental illness, where the conservative 
newspaper used negative terminology as a stand in for these generic terms. The second theme 
focuses on more mainstream liberal depictions of Ashley that minimize her ‘prisoner’ label through 
gendered mental illness stereotypes. These depictions bring portrayals of Ashley back to 
stereotypical mental illness labels through their emphasis of vulnerability, while they 
simultaneously move away from portraying her as a ‘resistant’ (and potentially dangerous) 
prisoner. The final theme that emerged from these news articles is the suggestion from some 
journalists that Ashley was not mentally ill. Instead, it is claimed that Ashley was an intentionally 
resistant prisoner, and as such, her ‘negative behaviour’ must be understood as something more 
complex than pathological symptomology. This possibility is only raised in liberal and centrist 
newspapers, and even in those papers it is only a suggestion. However, the fact that these 
‘alternative’ stories of Ashley Smith exist signals that her experiences of imprisonment may be 
more complex than what was commonly portrayed. 
 
Generic References & Negative Labels 
 
In the news coverage of Ashley Smith, journalists use many different terms to indicate to readers 
that she was mentally ill. Typically these mental illness labels are applied in the opening paragraph 
of the news article. A sample of some of the more frequently re-occurring mental health labels used 
include: “obviously troubled” (Brennan, 24 August 2010, A.9); “very troubled, desperately ill 
young Canadian” (Heard, 9 May 2011, A.12); “challenged young person” (McHardie, 21 
November 2007, A.1); “mentally ill Moncton woman” (Linke, 21 November 2007, A.3); “an 
extremely troubled woman” (Linke, 20 May 2008, A.1); “a severely disturbed young woman” 
(Anonymous, 5 March 2009, A.6); “the emotionally disturbed 19-year-old” (Linke, 24 October 
2008, A.1); “extremely challenging” (Linke, 24 October 2008, A.1); and “a mentally ill teen” 
(Pritchett, 9 June 2010, A.1). From this sample it is clear that in describing Ashley Smith journalists 
relied upon generic references (e.g., ‘mentally ill’) and negative terminology (‘troubled’, 
‘disturbed’).  
The specific terms ‘disturbed’ and ‘troubled’ are used to describe Ashley’s mental illness 
at least once in all four newspapers. Although it may be tempting to view this trend as an attempt 
by journalists to be sympathetic, I argue in a later section that journalists tend to emphasize 
Ashley’s vulnerability and helplessness to invoke audience pity. Instead of conjuring sympathy, 
the use of the words ‘troubled’ and ‘disturbed’ results in labeling Ashley Smith as someone who 
was out of control, potentially dangerous and ‘out of touch’ with reality. This indicates that these 
words reflect the negative stereotypes associated with mental illness. As argued by Wahl, Wood 
and Richards (2002), negative descriptors when used in conjunction with a mental illness label 
suggest that mentally ill individuals are “unchangeably dysfunctional and incapable of meaningful 
contributions to the community” (p. 25). 
Wahl et al. (2002) also maintain that generic labels inaccurately present mental illness as a 
uniform condition which fails to acknowledge the “the varieties of disorders, symptoms and 
outcomes encompassed with the term mental illness” (p. 24). Even though most people diagnosed 
with a mental illness are neither violent nor dysfunctional, in generically describing Ashley Smith’s 
‘problem’ behaviours as a result of mental illness, readers are given the “impression that ‘mental 
illness’ is synonymous with severe disability” (Wahl et al., 2002, p. 24) and unpredictability. Only 













specify Ashley’s mental illness. Each paper published one article in which the reporters used 
psychiatric assessments performed on Ashley when she was fifteen to show that she was mentally 
ill. Interestingly, each article described Ashley as having a different mental illness. For example, 
the Toronto Star preferred “oppositional defiant disorder” (Zlomislic, 10 October 2009, A.1) while 
the Globe and Mail described her as having a “learning disorder and borderline personality 
disorder” (Blatchford, 1 April 2011, A.10). This variation in diagnosis supports Caplan’s (1995) 
claim that defining or classifying ‘mental illness’ is subjective and that mental health professionals 
rarely agree upon specific diagnoses and treatment plans. Each of the diagnoses applied to Ashley 
Smith represents a different set of symptoms and potential outcomes which range from mild to 
severe. In assigning specific diagnoses, mental health professionals are shaped by social, cultural, 
political, economic, ethnic, and gender factors (Doucet et al., 2010).  
It is interesting that one of the diagnoses assigned to Ashley Smith is borderline personality 
disorder (BPD). According to Shaw and Proctor (2005): 
 
The diagnosis of BPD is the latest manifestation of historical attempts to explain away the 
strategies which some women use to survive and resist oppression and abuse, by describing 
these strategies as symptomatic of a disturbed personality/pathology (p. 484). 
 
The foundation of each of the two specific diagnoses applied to Ashley Smith rely upon 
stereotypical assumptions about gender expectations, predominately those influenced by white 
femininity—silence, passiveness and subordination (Shaw & Proctor, 2005). Reflective of the 
arguments I have made in other sections, the gendered and racialized biases of mental illness 
labeling means that the diagnosis of BPD is most commonly applied to white women who deviate 
from feminine norms (Shaw & Proctor, 2005). This is not to say that racialized women are immune 
from BPD diagnoses, but rather they are less likely to be understood as ‘ill’ and more likely to be 
labeled differently (e.g., aggressive, criminal) (De Genna & Feske, 2013).  According to Cauffman, 
Lexcen, Goldweber, Shulman and Grisson (2007), incarcerated girls are more likely than 
incarcerated boys to be diagnosed with disruptive behaviour disorders, such as oppositional defiant 
disorder or conduct disorder (p. 289). According to Pollack and Kendall (2005), BPD is one of the 
most dominant labels attached to imprisoned women, which is not all that surprising since carceral 
spaces are also misogynist and patriarchal spaces. Furthermore, they contend that in this context, 
BPD is a “pejorative” label “both because the behaviors [sic] exhibited by those given these 
diagnoses are often difficult for others to deal with and because BPD has traditionally been thought 
to be permanent and untreatable” (2005, p. 76). Furthermore, in privileging a psycho-medical 
model that constructs women’s ‘difficult’ behaviours as pathological, medical and penal systems 
continue to perpetuate “the invisibility of social and cultural influences” (Pollack & Kendall, 2005, 
p. 76), such as histories of childhood abuse and previous victimization. Therefore, diagnosing 
women with BPD or ‘oppositional personalities’ allows for the maintenance of patriarchal 
oppression and control through the medicalization of women’s ‘difficult’ (e.g., resistant) 
behaviours. 
Although all four newspapers use these two negative terms, the National Post is the only 
newspaper that uses them as primary descriptors. In this newspaper, the terms ‘troubled’ and 
‘disturbed’ are used in place of generic ‘mentally ill’ references. From the use of these terms that 
relate to mental and emotional states, the reader may infer that Ashley Smith was mentally ill. This 
result indicates that although negative terminology is present in each newspaper, the overall 













opposite is true for readers of the National Post since these negative terms are frequently used as 
the only descriptors of Ashley’s mental illness. This means that the political affiliations of 
newspapers might affect how mental illness is depicted in news media. Though the conservative 
National Post does implicitly label Ashley Smith as mentally ill, this topic is not the primary focus 
of any of the articles published. In comparison, mental illness is the primary focus in approximately 
12% of the Telegraph-Journal articles, 8% of the Toronto Star articles, and 3% of the Globe and 
Mail articles. So although each newspaper labels Ashley Smith as mentally ill, the newsworthiness 
of this topic changes based on politics. This variation suggests that labeling Ashley Smith as 
mentally ill in news articles holds political significance. 
 
Ashley Smith was not a ‘Hardened Criminal’ 
 
According to the literature, stereotypes associated with mental illness labels vary depending on 
gender. Mentally ill men are typically associated with violence and dangerousness, whereas 
mentally ill women tend to be portrayed as vulnerable and dependent. As such, it is not surprising 
that Ashley Smith’s vulnerability is emphasized, even though the picture presented of her was often 
not one of vulnerability. Some of the behaviours displayed by Ashley Smith (e.g., spitting, cursing, 
aggressiveness) are typically associated with masculinity and dangerousness. Even some of the 
charges against Ashley—most of which were laid in an institutional setting—are typically 
associated with violence and dangerousness: uttering threats, assault with a weapon, assaulting a 
peace officer, and possession of a prohibited weapon (Cheney, 21 November 2007, A.1). Despite 
these allegations, readers are prompted to conceptualize Ashley Smith through the rhetoric of 
vulnerability associated with her mental illness: “vulnerable, lonely, utterly miserable 19-year-old 
girl” (Blatchford, 20 May 2011, A.7); “[…] people like Ms. Smith, unseen, utterly powerless and 
vulnerable” (Anonymous, 18 May 2011, A.22). News articles about Ashley Smith minimize details 
that associate her with dangerousness and violence by focusing on the fact that she was a mentally 
ill white woman. Although this lop-sided depiction of a feminized Ashley Smith provides an ideal 
platform to invoke public sympathy, under this rubric of vulnerability Ashley Smith’s behaviours 
are linked to pathology rather than intention and resistance.  
Feminist researchers Chesler (1972) and Rosenfield (1982) maintain that when women 
transgress gender expectations, medical practitioners often explain away their behaviour as a 
symptom of ‘illness’. Shaw and Proctor (2005) contend that when women are resistant to 
oppressive patriarchal authority, this resistance is pathologized as irrational and deviant. This 
pathologizing of gender role transgression is not limited to mental health professionals. Most liberal 
and centrist news articles written about Ashley Smith reduce her ‘negative’ behaviour to a sign that 
she was “an extremely troubled woman” (Linke, 20 May 2008, A.1). These depictions diminish the 
possibility of understanding Ashley’s actions outside the stereotypical rubric of female pathology. 
In emphasizing Ashley Smith’s vulnerability, mainstream news articles from the Toronto Star, 
Telegraph-Journal and Globe and Mail eliminate the possibility of discussion of the issue of 
punishing women who dissent from patriarchal authority.   
The use of images of vulnerability, however,  is not entirely negative. Liberal and centrist 
(Toronto Star, Telegraph-Journal, Globe and Mail) newspapers used Ashley’s vulnerability as a 
platform to highlight Ashley’s humanity and to challenge typical ‘prisoner’ labels. Given Ashley’s 
aggressive behaviours and that she was incarcerated at the time of her death, it is expected that 
newspapers would use typical ‘prisoner’ labels. According to modified labeling theories, these 













punitive actions taken against him or her by prison officials. Counter to this expectation, liberal and 
centrist news articles that refer to Ashley as a ‘prisoner’ typically challenge the validity of applying 
this label to her. Acknowledging that Ashley was a person and a prisoner has the potential to direct 
attention to the processes and practices that create criminality, and to facilitate recognition of the 
political construction of crime and criminal behaviours. Additionally, humanizing Ashley also 
implicitly encourages readers to focus upon the actual prison practices (e.g., long-term segregation) 
that may have influenced her behaviour, and thus contributed to the construction of her as mentally 
ill. 
Unfortunately, these liberal and centrist news articles on Ashley Smith dispute her 
‘prisoner’ label by maintaining a dichotomous relationship between Ashley and ‘other’ prisoners. 
In this dichotomy, ‘offender first’ language is considered acceptable for incarcerated individuals 
who are not mentally ill. Offender first language emphasizes the ‘offender’ label over any other 
characteristic of the individual—the primary identity ascribed to the person is that of ‘offender’. 
Similar to Becker’s concept of ‘master status’ (1963), offender first language also affects how 
incarcerated individuals come to understand themselves as ‘outsiders’ (Becker, 1963). Prison 
reform advocates, such as Pollack (2007), maintain that ‘offender first’ language perpetuates the 
notion of a reified ‘offender’ identity and that individual criminality is the result of a rational choice 
of wrongdoing. This ‘offender first’ language legitimates biological deterministic theories, which 
argue that ‘offenders’ are biologically different from ‘law-abiding people’. Frequently, liberal and 
centrist news articles draw on this distinction reminding readers that Ashley was not your ‘typical 
hardened criminal’. As stated in an article that appeared in the Globe and Mail: “Ashley Smith was 
not a killer or a hardened criminal; she was a mentally ill 19-year-old with personality disorders” 
(Anonymous, 10 March 2009, A.16). With the exception of the National Post, this depiction of 
Ashley Smith is consistent across time and all newspapers:  
 
What follows are just some of the measures to which [Ashley Smith] was subjected while 
in one form of custody or another in this country—and all of this, you must bear in mind, 
was done not to some hardened violent criminal, but to a mentally disturbed girl 
(Blatchford, Globe and Mail, 2 April 2011, A.2; emphasis added). 
 
[Even though Ashley Smith’s] behaviour was rooted in conditions over which she had 
little, if any, control, the justice system treated her as a delinquent (Anonymous, Telegraph-
Journal, 19 May 2011, A.8).  
 
I was literally in tears. They were tears of sadness, anger and frustration over how this very 
troubled, desperately ill young Canadian was treated like a criminal when she needed care 
(Heard, Toronto Star, 9 May 2011, A.12). 
 
This dichotomy is also accomplished by showcasing quotes from Ashley Smith’s mother—“She 
was treated like a criminal, not a girl who needed help” (Thanh Ha, 3 March 2009, A.1)—and non-
Correctional Service of Canada professionals—“[Dr. Beaudry] said that she was treated as if she 
were a dangerous individual with little or no actual evidence that she was” (Makin, 3 November 
2010, A.4). These portrayals of Ashley solidify a dichotomy between her and other ‘prisoners’, 
with the implication that the harsh punishments and penal practices Ashley experienced would be 













Different from the other three newspapers, the National Post challenges these depictions 
of Ashley Smith by maintaining her ‘prisoner’ label. While the other newspapers emphasize 
Ashley’s ‘mental health’ label, the National Post focuses upon her ‘prisoner’ label. Consistently 
throughout the articles, readers of the National Post are reminded that Ashley was a prisoner:  
 
Corrections Services of Canada yesterday fired four employees at the Grand Valley 
Institute for Women in Kitchener after an internal investigation into the death of inmate 
Ashley Smith (Anonymous, 17 January 2008, A.5). 
 
The inmate died in hospital of what Waterloo Regional Police called self-initiated 
asphyxiation after being found unconscious in her cell at the Grand Valley Institution in 
Kitchener, Ont. last October (Huber, 24 October 2008, A.10). 
 
Criminal charges have been withdrawn against four guards at the Grand Valley Institute 
for Women in Kitchener, in relation to the suffocation death of a 19-year-old female 
prisoner, the Crown attorney's office said yesterday (Crawford, 9 December 2008, A.9). 
 
Smith, originally from Moncton, N.B., was the youngest prisoner at the institution […] 
(Adam, 22 January 2010, A.5). 
 
The articles provide no depictions that separate Ashley Smith’s experience from that of ‘other’ 
prisoners. Unlike the other newspapers, news articles from the National Post typically label Ashley 
as a prisoner first, rather than as mentally ill. However, these news articles did discuss mental illness 
issues and implied that these details are relevant to Ashley’s story because she was a woman 
prisoner. According to feminist literature, depicting all incarcerated women as mentally ill 
effectively pathologizes women’s deviance and ‘problem’ behaviours. Women prisoners are 
presented as individuals who are ‘sick’ and in need of ‘treatment’. Under this pathology discourse, 
resistant women prisoners are discredited and silenced. As such, these conservative depictions of 
Ashley Smith as a prisoner coincide with traditional assumptions of female prisoner pathology. 
 
Was She Sick, or Incorrigible While Incarcerated? 
 
In this final section on labeling Ashley Smith as mentally ill, I discuss an ‘alternative’ depiction of 
her story. In these stories, journalists question whether Ashley Smith should be labeled as mentally 
ill. These alternative perspectives only appear in the liberal and centrist newspapers (Telegraph-
Journal, Toronto Star, Globe and Mail), and appear infrequently. However, they are worthy of 
analysis because they indicate that Ashley’s story may be more complicated than was typically 
depicted. 
The Telegraph-Journal, a local New Brunswick newspaper, was the first newspaper to 
publish this different perspective, raising the question as to whether or not Ashley Smith was 
mentally ill before her imprisonment. For example, one journalist writes that Ashley Smith was a 
“happy and stable young girl before her imprisonment” (Southwick , 26 November 2007, A.1). In 
another Telegraph-Journal article, a quote from Bernard Richard challenges “any one of us to 
spend that kind of time—two or three years—in that kind of facility and I’d be willing to bet that 
we’d have our rough days as well” (McHardie, 21 November 2007, A.1). Journalist Rob Linke, 













found mentally ill” (24 October 2008, A.1). In the Globe and Mail, an article entitled “How Prison 
Only Made Her Worse” includes the observation:  
 
On the streets of east-end Moncton, Ms. Smith had a reputation as a bit of a tough character. 
“She hung out with guys who caused trouble,” a former schoolmate said. “She wasn’t a 
girlie-girl, playing with Barbies.” Her family saw a softer side, a girl who liked to read, 
paint and paddle a kayak (Cheney, 8 December 2007, A.1). 
 
By writing that Ashley Smith was not officially labeled mentally ill prior to or while 
incarcerated, journalists from these newspapers problematize the assumption that Ashley’s 
mistreatment was because she was mentally ill. These few stories disclose that Ashley was not 
provided with a psychological assessment during her time in federal custody. These articles indicate 
that while she was incarcerated, Ashley was labeled as ‘difficult to manage’ and a ‘problem 
inmate’. Additionally, as shown by Cheney’s quote, this narrative describes Ashley as someone 
who deviated from feminine ideals (e.g., not wanting to play with dolls as a young girl; considered 
a ‘tough character’), which suggests that she may have also been resistant to the expectations of 
hegemonic femininity. In line with Baskin et al.’s (1989) study, women like Ashley who display 
traits typically associated masculinity are often read as ‘risky’ and responded to with punishment. 
Given Ashley’s long-term placement in segregation cells, forced medicalization, and experiences 
of physical restraint, it is suggestive within these narratives that prison officials responded to her 
not as a mentally ill prisoner, but as a resistant prisoner.  
Unfortunately, rather than pursuing this new angle of the mistreatment of a prisoner labeled 
‘difficult to manage’, the journalists of each of these articles argued that not diagnosing Ashley as 
mentally ill was the problem. In doing so, they diminish the argument that Ashley’s behaviours 
might have been intentionally resistant and/or coping behaviours in an intolerable situation. In 
doing so, they minimized the potential of these stories to offer a different side of Ashley’s story. 
For example: 
 
[Ashley Smith] was by all accounts a troubled young woman, but was jail the answer 
(Cheney, Globe and Mail, 8 December 2007, A.1)? 
 
Smith was the emotionally disturbed 19-year-old inmate from Moncton whose death on 
Oct. 19, 2007 in the Grand Valley Institution for Women resulted in charges of criminal 
negligence causing death against three guards and a supervisor, as well as the firing of two 
prison managers (Linke, Telegraph-Journal, 24 October 2008, A.1). 
 
Smith, who suffered from a mental illness, was not [given a choice] (Southwick, 
Telegraph-Journal, 26 November 2007, A.1). 
 
To think [Ashley Smith, an] already challenged young person lived through this and ended 
up acting up "and then being charged and charged again, perhaps over 50 times, 
institutional charges" (McHardie, Telegraph-Journal, 21 November 2007, A.1). 
 
There is one news article published in the Toronto Star that directly challenges labeling 
Ashley Smith as mentally ill. Rosie DiManno describes Ashley Smith as being “incorrigible while 













crushing” (March 2009, A.2) that she met punitive responses. DiManno depicted her as someone 
who was frequently combative and refused to passively accept prison authority. In this article, 
DiManno claims that Ashley was an “iconoclast” (9 March 2009, A.2) and challenged the notion 
that her behaviour was the result of a mental illness: 
 
In page after page of analysis, [Ashley Smith] is described as defiant, combative, 
unyielding to rules, refusing to conform: an obstinate and powerful personality, the 
proverbial square peg being forced to fit into a round hole, a juvenile iconoclast who fought 
tooth and nail in hanging on to a personality others deemed “oppositional” and 
“narcissistic” and “disrespectful”. 
 
But the more she resisted, the further she was restricted and punished, caught in a crazy 
Catch-22 that had disaster written all over it. 
 
However disturbed, rebellious, as an adolescent, Ashley Smith was sane. It was the 
adults—screws and jailers and clipboard clods—who made her crazy (DiManno, 9 March 
2009, A.2). 
 
This narrative presents Ashley Smith as a woman who was defiant, aggressive, and vocal. Unlike 
the journalists before, DiManno does not deflect this image of Ashley with mental illness labels. 
This alternative depiction of Ashley as resistant supports the analysis that labeling her ‘disturbed’ 
is subjective and rooted in medicalization and patriarchal understandings.  
Although this ‘alternative’ story is only published once and only appears in the Toronto 
Star, the fact that it exists signals that Ashley’s story may be more complex than was presented in 
the other news articles. This alternative story that introduced Ashley as intentionally resistant prods 




Gendered mental illness stereotypes discussed by modified labeling theorists were reflected in the 
news coverage on Ashley Smith. However, the stereotypes used varied depending on the political 
affiliation of the newspaper. Liberal and centrist newspapers (Toronto Star, Telegraph-Journal, 
Globe and Mail) tended to align with stereotypes that portrayed mentally ill women as vulnerable. 
On the other hand, the conservative newspaper (National Post) presented a less sympathetic 
portrayal of Ashley by using negative mental illness terminology and emphasizing her ‘prisoner’ 
label. As this analysis illustrates, mental illness labeling in the media is often more complex than 
has been previously discussed in the extant literature. This research contributes to modified labeling 
theories by lending support to their main theoretical assertion that mental illness labels are socially 
constructed and affected by many sociopolitical factors, while considering the influence of news 
coverage timing and newspaper political affiliation on the depictions of mental illness stereotypes 
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